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Quantum cryptography – the application of quantum computing techniques to 
cryptography has been extensively investigated. Two major directions of quantum 
cryptography are quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum encryption, with the 
former focusing on secure key distribution and the latter focusing on encryption using 
quantum algorithms. In contrast to the success of the QKD, the development of quantum 
encryption algorithms is limited to designs of mostly one-time pads (OTP) that are 
unsuitable for most communication needs. In this work we propose a non-OTP quantum 
encryption scheme utilizing a quantum state creation process to encrypt messages. As 
essentially a non-OTP quantum block cipher the method stands out against existing 
methods with the following features: 1. complex key-ciphertext relation (i.e. confusion) 
and complex plaintext-ciphertext relation (i.e. diffusion); 2. mode of operation design for 
practical encryption on multiple blocks. These features provide key reusability and 
protection against eavesdropping and standard cryptanalytic attacks. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Cryptography – the study of secure communication in the presence of eavesdropping adversaries 
– is an important application of classical computation and information processing. Along with the 
rapid development of quantum computation and quantum information, the application of quantum 
computing techniques to cryptography has been extensively investigated [1-4]. A prominent 
example is the potential of the Shor’s factorization algorithm [5] to break the most widely used 
public-key encryption system. Facing this challenge, classical cryptography is considering post-
quantum cryptographic systems [6, 7] that are secure against current and future quantum 
algorithms. On the other hand, the emergence of cryptographic systems based on quantum 
technologies has also led to the burgeoning field of quantum cryptography. Currently there are two 
major directions of quantum cryptography: quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum 
encryption algorithm. The QKD [2, 3, 8-11] focuses on secure key generation and distribution by 
exploiting quantum phenomena such as the probabilistic nature of quantum measurement and the 
non-locality of entanglement. The development of the QKD has successfully produced widely 
accepted key-distribution protocols such as the BB84 [3]. Note that the QKD only processes the 
keys while the encryption process, decryption process, and the communication process have to use 
established classical algorithms and channels. Quantum encryption algorithm on the other hand 
uses quantum computing techniques to encrypt messages (classical or quantum) into quantum 
states that are communicated to and decrypted by the recipient. In contrast to the well accepted 
success of the QKD, the development of quantum encryption algorithms is rather limited to designs 
[12-14] that are mostly quantum versions of the one-time pad (OTP). The OTP is an encryption 
scheme that ensures information-theoretic security in the sense that the ciphertext (i.e. the 
encrypted message) provides no information at all on the plaintext (i.e. the original message) to 
any cryptanalytic attempt – which means the OTP is unbreakable even with infinite computational 
resources [15]. However, a critical problem with using the OTP is that each original message 
requires a unique key of the same length as the message itself. As the key must be random and can 
never be re-used, the generation, transfer, and storage of the keys of an OTP are difficult in practice, 
making the OTP not suitable for the majority of the communication needs of the present day. 
Consequently most widely used encryption schemes such as the symmetric encryption Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) [16] and the asymmetric encryption Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) 
[17] offer not information-theoretic security but computational security – i.e. breaking the 
encryption requires currently unrealistic computational resources. So far as we know, the only 
quantum encryption scheme of a non-OTP block cipher design was proposed by Zhou et. al. in 
2007 [18]. However, the encryption process of the scheme uses one qubit of the quantum key to 
encrypt one qubit of the plaintext in the form of a quantum state – this results in a simple qubit-to-
qubit relation between the plaintext and the ciphertext such that the cipher is vulnerable to basic 
cryptanalysis. In addition, the block cipher also lacks a design of a mode of operation [19] that is 
essential to the practical use of a block cipher. Due to these problems this quantum encryption 
scheme has to rely on a “check process” equivalent to an OTP [18], which the original block cipher 
design wants to avoid. In this work we propose a new non-OTP quantum encryption scheme that 
utilizes a quantum state creation process to encrypt messages. We introduce the concepts of 
confusion (complex key-ciphertext relation) and diffusion (complex plaintext-ciphertext relation) 
from classical cryptography into quantum encryption and propose a novel encryption process that 
ensures both confusion and diffusion. In addition, we introduce the concept of mode of operation 
from classical cryptography into quantum encryption to enable practical encryption on arbitrary 
number of blocks of plaintexts. The use of a quantum state ciphertext together with features of 
confusion, diffusion, and mode of operation allows reusability of the keys and provides strong 
protection against standard cryptanalytic attacks including the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) and 
the chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA1 and CCA2). 
 
II. Theory of the quantum encryption design 
2.1 Encrypting classical data with quantum states.  
The essence of any encryption scheme with computational security is a reversible process whose 
computational cost strongly depends on a secret piece of information called the key. In this work 
we focus on the symmetric-key scenario where decryption uses the same key as encryption. 
Consider an n-bit classical plaintext, for the legitimate parties of the communication Alice and 
Bob knowing the key, both encryption and decryption are computationally simple in the sense that 
the number of computational steps required is polynomial: i.e.  kO cn  for some constant c  and 
k  such that kcn  is overwhelmingly smaller than 2n , i.e. 2 2n k ncn  . In the meanwhile, for the 
third party adversary Eve not knowing the key, both encryption and decryption are 
computationally hard in the sense that the number of computational steps required is exponential: 
i.e. greater than  2nO . To achieve this with our new quantum encryption scheme Alice starts 
with an n-qubit quantum state in the initial state 0 n . The first step Alice applies at most n Pauli-
X gates to encode an n-bit classical plaintext into a quantum state plaintext: e.g. 00101 is coded 
into 00101 . The second step she applies a polynomial sequence of 1-qubit and 2-qubit 
elementary gates to transform the quantum plaintext into a quantum state that serves as the 
quantum ciphertext, and then sends it to Bob. The account of the polynomial sequence of 
elementary gates used by Alice is the key pre-shared with Bob such that upon receiving the 
quantum ciphertext Bob can apply the inverse operations to recover the quantum plaintext. The 
classical plaintext can then be revealed by projection measurement on the quantum plaintext in the 
computational basis. So far without going into any detail, the just described process is not so 
different from a generalization of existing studies, and we will later in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 present 
the novel encryption process design and the mode of operation that provide reusability of the keys 
and protection against standard cryptanalytic attacks. However, here we first discuss certain 
security already provided by just considering the quantum nature of the ciphertext.  
Firstly, note the fact that a quantum state ciphertext naturally contains more uncertainty than a 
classical ciphertext. For example a classical bit 0 (1) can be mapped to a qubit state 0  ( 1 ), 
which after a unitary operation becomes 1 20 1a a  (
* *
2 10 1a a ), where 
2 2
1 2 1a a  . For 
simplicity we can assume real coefficients, then as the coefficient 1a  can vary continuously from 
0 to 1, the information entropy associated with 1a  is infinite. If for practical use 1a  can only take 
N discrete values between 0 and 1 the information entropy associated with it is still  log 1N   as 
long as 2N  . Of course this does not mean that one qubit can carry more than 1 bit of information 
because only 1 bit of information can be deterministically measured at the recipient given that the 
key 1a  is known. However, for encryption purpose a ciphertext in the form of 1 20 1a a  causes 
more difficulty to the eavesdropper Eve, because even if she has successfully intercepted the state 
1 20 1a a , without the key (with size  log 1N  ) she cannot reliably read the content of the 
ciphertext. This difficulty for Eve – or security for the legitimate parties – is much more significant 
for a multi-qubit ciphertext state in which qubits are entangled with each other. The quantum 
encryption scheme exploits the quantum phenomena of superposition and entanglement to produce 
a ciphertext that cannot even be read without the key. In comparison, a classical ciphertext 
typically has the same bit-size as the plaintext, and it can be read and analyzed by Eve to gain 
information on the key and the plaintext.  
Secondly, even if Eve is able to read the ciphertext – assume the highly unlikely scenario that Alice 
sends the same ciphertext state many times and Eve is able to gain statistical knowledge of it – we 
will show that she cannot deduce the key from the ciphertext within polynomial computational 
steps.  
Statement 1. For any n-qubit ciphertext created by applying a polynomially long 
sequence K of 1-qubit and 2-qubit elementary gates on some n-qubit plaintext, 
suppose an adversary Eve can retrieve the coefficient associated with any basis state 
(e.g. she calls the basis state 01010  for a 5-qubit ciphertext, and get the 
coefficient 01010C ), then she cannot deduce K within polynomial number of  steps.  
To understand Statement 1 we first cite the result from our previous study on state complexity [20] 
that any sequence of 1-qubit and 2-qubit elementary gates is equivalent to a sequence of 2-qubit 
controlled-unitary gates or  C U ’s. All quantum states that can be created by polynomially long 
sequences of 1-qubit and 2-qubit elementary gates (or concisely all polynomial states) thus 
correspond to all the sequences of  iC U ’s with the lengths smaller than kcn  for some constant 
c  and k  such that kcn  is overwhelmingly smaller than 2n . The complexity of a sequence of 
 iC U ’s comes from the parameters used to define the iU ’s and the configuration of the sequence: 
each  iC U  has a control qubit and a target qubit that are selected from the n qubits, and the 
configuration of a sequence of length kcn  is specified by the kcn  number of control-target qubit 
pairs. Now suppose we are given a quantum state known to be created by a sequence of the length 
equal to kcn , to determine the exact sequence used we need to first determine its configuration, 
and then the parameters of each iU  can be determined by a system of equations defined by the 
configuration. The total possible number of configurations is    2, 2
kk cncnP n n n   (where 
 , 2P n  is the permutation of choosing one control and one target out of n qubits), which is an 
extremely large number 2n . If we consider the fact that the  iC U ’s may commute, then the 
number of unique configurations will be smaller. It is hard to evaluate the effect of commutation 
without some knowledge of the  iC U ’s in the sequence. However, in a particular example, we 
can design the sequence in a way that each  iC U  is non-commutative to the previous  1iC U   
and thus the number of unique configurations can be easily obtained. We assume the starting 
quantum state is created from 0 n  by applying a iU  to each iq  such that it is in a superposition 
between 0  and 1 . We apply the sequence         1 2 3 4, , , ,...j k k l l h h gC U C U C U C U     to 
the starting state, where the subscript j k  means jq  is the control and kq  is the target. In this 
sequence each  iC U  uses the target of the previous  1iC U   as the control, which ensures that 
 iC U  is non-commutative to  1iC U  . As we can choose the initial jq  from n qubits, the initial 
target kq  from 1n  qubits (excluding jq ), and subsequent targets from 1n  qubits (excluding 
its own control), the total number of unique configurations is  1
kcnn n  . This example gives a 
lower bound on the number of unique configurations by restricting the control of each  iC U  to 
be the target of the previous  1iC U  . If we remove this restriction and consider commutation, 
then the actual possible number M of unique configurations falls in the range 
   21
kk cncnn n M n n    : clearly M is an extremely large number 2n . Consequently it is 
impossible to determine the configuration unless there is a very efficient way to sort through the 
extremely large number of possible configurations. Currently there is no efficient way to relate the 
coefficients of a quantum state to the configuration. Although we cannot decisively prove that 
there will never be a way to do so, it is highly unlikely for the following reason. Firstly as the 
configuration contains the information on the control and target qubits of each  iC U , it also tells 
us how many  iC U  gates are used to create the state. Suppose such a method is developed such 
that Eve could determine the configuration of any polynomial quantum state within polynomial 
steps, then there must exist a collection of polynomial number of procedures (each of the 
procedures takes polynomial steps to perform) that she can perform on an arbitrary polynomial 
state and discover the configuration before the procedures are exhausted. This means that given a 
general n-qubit state, she can just perform these procedures on the state assuming as if it is 
polynomial, and if it gives a configuration before the procedures are exhausted, then we know how 
many steps are required to create the state; otherwise if it does not give a configuration before the 
procedures are exhausted, then it is not a polynomial state. Consequently the ability of Eve to 
efficiently determine the configuration of a polynomial state leads to her ability to tell if a general 
quantum state is polynomial or not. This is a contradiction to the result proved in our previous 
work [20] that it is exponentially hard to determine if a general quantum state can be created within 
polynomial number of gates. We therefore conclude that the key of our quantum encryption 
scheme is secure even if Eve has gained significant information on the ciphertext state. 
2.2 The quantum encryption with confusion and diffusion.  
So far we have seen two important security features of the quantum encryption design: the 
difficulty in reading the quantum ciphertext and the impossibility to deduce the key even if the 
quantum ciphertext is somehow known. These features however are not sufficient for a good 
encryption method: to provide reusability of keys and protection against standard cryptanalytic 
attacks we need to design an encryption with good confusion and diffusion [15]. Confusion means 
complex relation between the ciphertext and the key such that it is difficult to deduce key properties 
by analyzing the patterns in ciphertexts. Classically if one bit in the ciphertext depends on multiple 
parts of the key, confusion is provided. For our quantum encryption scheme, as the ciphertext 
cannot be measured deterministically, confusion can be accordingly defined that the statistics of 
measuring one qubit in the ciphertext state depends on multiple parts of the key. Diffusion means 
complex relation between the plaintext and the ciphertext such that it is difficult to deduce plaintext 
properties by analyzing the patterns in ciphertexts or vice versa. Classically if changing one bit in 
the plaintext (ciphertext) changes more than half of the bits in the ciphertext (plaintext), diffusion 
is provided. Again since in our quantum encryption the ciphertext cannot be measured 
deterministically, diffusion can be defined that changing the value of one qubit in the plaintext 
leads to changes of statistics of measuring more than half of the qubits in the ciphertext. Note the 
vice versa ciphertext-to-plaintext relation is not defined for the quantum case because it is 
impossible to create a proper ciphertext without knowing the plaintext and the key first. 
We start with a basic encryption design where one unitary iU  with real parameters (for simplicity 
we assume all parameters in the following discussions are real, however the method can be 
generalized to have complex parameters) is applied to each qubit iq  of the plaintext, and no CNOT 
is applied. The key is then the collection  iU  where the order of iU ’s is unimportant. Clearly this 
encryption does not provide either confusion or diffusion because the statistical pattern of 
measuring each qubit iq  of the ciphertext depends on only one part of the key iU  and only one 
qubit (the same iq ) of the plaintext. For example suppose after this step in the ciphertext 
1 1 21 1
0 1q a a   and 2 1 22 20 1q b b  , then the probability of measuring 0  for 1q  is 
  2110p a  and the probability of measuring 0  for 2q  is   2120p b . If this key is reused 
many times, Eve would be able to deduce 1U  and 2U  by measuring the probability of outcomes 
for 1q  and 2q  of the ciphertext (the same for all other qubits). Now after this step if we apply 
1 2CNOT  (where 1 2  means 1q  is the control and 2q  is the target), the 2-qubit state is: 
      2 1 1 2 2 1 21 2 2 1 2 20 0 1 1 1 0a b b a b b       (1) 
then by simple calculation   2110p a  still but   2 2 2 21 1 2 220p a b a b   – we see that 2q  gains a 
dependence on 1U  in the sense that the probabilities of outcomes when measuring 2q  depend on 
1U  after 1 2CNOT  is applied. If we further apply 2 3CNOT   to 3 1 23 30 1q c c  , the 3-qubit 
state is:  
          3 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 21 1 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 30 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0a b a b c c a b a b c c         (2) 
then   2110p a ,   2 2 2 21 1 2 220p a b a b  ,      2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 230p a b a b c a b a b c     – i.e. 3q  
gains dependences on both 1U  and 2U . The results in Eqs. (1) and (2) reveal the effects of 1-qubit 
unitaries and CNOT’s from a cryptographic perspective:  
Theorem 1. If the probabilities of outcomes when measuring a qubit depend on 
some 1-qubit unitaries applied to this or any other qubit, we say this qubit has 
dependences on these 1-qubit unitaries. Then a 1-qubit unitary creates dependences 
on its target qubit and a CNOT causes the target qubit to gain all the dependences 
from the control qubit, while the control qubit retaining all its dependences. 
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose 1q  is one qubit in a general n-qubit state 
 n , the Schmidt 
decomposition of   n  with respect to 1q  is:  
          1 11 1 1 2 2 2 2 11 1 1 10 1 0 1n n nC a a C a a         (3) 
where  11
n   and  12
n   are orthogonal, and therefore   2 2 2 21 1 2 210p C a C a  : this means 1q  
depends on the pairs  1 2,C C  and  1 2,a a  that are created by previous quantum operations used 
to generate  n . Now applying another unitary gate 1 2
2 1
u u
U
u u
    
 to 1q  we get: 
 
       
     
1
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 11 1
1
2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 11 1
0 1
0 1
n n
n
U C a u a u a u a u
C a u a u a u a u
 



     
     
  (4) 
where      2 22 21 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 210p C a u a u C a u a u    , so indeed 1q  has gained dependence on U . 
Note that for any U ,    1 1 2 2 1 2 2 11 10 1a u a u a u a u    is always orthogonal to  
   2 1 1 2 2 2 1 11 10 1a u a u a u a u    , and thus the probabilities of no qubit other than 1q  are 
affected by U . Now suppose we further Schmidt-decompose  11
n   and  12
n   in Eq. (3) with 
respect to another qubit 2q : 
 
           
         
2 2
1 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 11 1 22 2 2 2 1 1
2 2
2 21 21 21 22 22 22 22 21 2 12 2 2 2 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
n n n
n n
C D b b D b b a a
C D b b D b b a a
  
 
 
 
      
      
  (5) 
where        2 2 2 211 12 21 22 0
n n n n        , and then we can calculate the probability:
     2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 11 11 12 12 2 21 21 22 2220p C D b D b C D b D b    . We see that 1q  and 2q  share a dependence on 
the pair  1 2,C C  but the dependence on  1 2,a a  is unique to 1q . Now apply 1 2CNOT  to  n : 
 
 
       
       
       
   
2 2
1 1 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 112 2 2 2
1 2 12 2
2 2 21 21 21 22 22 22 22 212 2 2 2
2 2
2 1 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 112 2 2 2
2
1 2 21 21 21 22 222 2
0 1 0 1
CNOT 0
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 0
n n
n
n n
n n
n
a C D b b D b b
a C D b b D b b
a C D b b D b b
a C D b b D
 

 
 

 
  
 

               
    
       1222 22 212 2
1
1 0n b b 
 
 
     
  (6) 
After some algebra we obtain: 
 
         
           
   
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 11 11 12 12 2 21 22 22 21 2 2 21 21 22 22 1 11 12 12 112
2 2 2 2
11 21 11 21 11 21 12 22 11 22 11 22 11 22 12 21
1 2 1 2 2 2
12 21 12 21 12 21
0
2
n n n n
n n
p a C D b D b C D b D b a C D b D b C D b D b
D D b b b b D D b b b b
a a C C
D D b b
   
 
   
 
             
  

        2 211 22 12 22 12 22 12 22 11 21n nb b D D b b b b  
 
 
    
 
 (7) 
where we see that 2q  has gained dependence on the pair  1 2,a a , which was originally unique to 
1q . Because the form of 
 n  in Eq. (3) is entirely general, 1q ’s dependence on  1 2,a a  can be 
understood as a package including all its dependences gained in the process of creating  n  – 
through either 1-qubit unitaries applied to 1q  or CNOT’s applied to 1q  as the target. Eq. (7) shows 
that by a single 1 2CNOT  all 1q ’s dependences packaged in  1 2,a a  are created on 2q . It is trivial 
to see that 1q  still retains its dependences. This concludes the proof for Theorem 1. Note that the 
dependences created on 2q  are not the same as those on 1q  – the probabilities indeed depend on 
the same unitaries, but the exact forms are different. Theorem 1 is significant that it allows us to 
create new probability dependences with 1-qubit unitaries on selective qubits and then efficiently 
pass them onto other qubits by CNOT gates. In the following we show how to use this result to 
design an encrypting process with good confusion and diffusion properties.  
The encrypting process with good confusion and diffusion: 
  
Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the encrypting process with an 8-qubit example. The circles with 
numbers inside represent the qubits. The arrows represent CNOT gates for which each arrow begins 
at the control qubit and points to the target qubit. The numbers on the arrows indicate the order in 
which the CNOT gates are applied within the current step. Step 1: apply a 1-qubit iU  to each qubit 
iq . Step 2: apply 1CNOTi i   sequentially for 1 to 1i n  , this step causes the downstream 
qubits 5 to 8 to gain dependences on more than half of the iU ’s. Step 3: use the downstream qubits 
5 to 8 as controls and the upstream qubits 1 to 4 as targets to apply CNOT gates. Showing one 
example out of the !
2
n 
  
 possible ways the qubits are paired. The CNOT gates in this step all 
commute so the order is unimportant. After this step confusion is achieved. Step 4: with the general 
goal of achieving diffusion, this step has great freedom. In the particular example shown here, a 
series of CNOT gates run alternately between the downstream and upstream qubits. After this step 
diffusion is achieved.  
 
Start with an n-qubit plaintext where each qubit iq  is either 0  or 1 . 
Step 1: Apply a 1-qubit unitary iU  to each qubit iq  and create the initial dependence of 
each iq  to its corresponding iU . This is the basic key design mentioned earlier. If each iU  
is defined by a real parameter that can take N discrete values, there are totally nN  
possibilities that contribute to key size. This step costs n iU  gates. 
Step 2: Apply 1CNOTi i   sequentially for 1 to 1i n  : i.e. 1 2CNOT  first, then 
2 3CNOT  , then 3 4CNOT  , … , finally 1CNOTn n  . By Theorem 1, the 1 2CNOT  causes 
2q  to gain the dependence on 1U  from 1q , and then 2 3CNOT   causes 3q  to gain all the 
dependences from 2q  that include both 2U  from 2q  itself and 1U  that 2q  has just gained 
from 1q . In such a snowball process, each further 1CNOTk k   causes 1kq   to gain 
dependences on all the iU ’s for i k . After this step each iq  with 2
ni   has gained 
dependences on more than half of the iU ’s. We remark that the order of the application of 
the 1CNOTi i   gates is important: if we apply 2 3CNOT   before 1 2CNOT , 2q  has not 
gained the dependence on 1U  from 1q  yet and thus 3q  will not gain that dependence either. 
Applying 2 3CNOT   before 1 2CNOT  is therefore less efficient than applying 2 3CNOT   
after 1 2CNOT  as the latter can pass more dependences from 2q  to 3q . This step costs 
1n  CNOT gates. 
Step 3: For each iq  with 2
ni   (the downstream qubits), randomly assign a different kq  
with 
2
nk   (the upstream qubits), such that all the qubits are paired (except one qubit if n 
is odd). Apply CNOTi k  for each pair such that the upstream kq  gains all the dependences 
from the downstream iq . After Step 2 each downstream iq  with 2
ni   depends on more 
than half of the iU ’s, and here by the CNOTi k  gates these downstream qubits pass all 
their dependences to the corresponding upstream qubits. Consequently now each one of 
the n qubits will have gained dependences on more than half of the iU ’, and this complex 
relation between the ciphertext and the key provides confusion as defined earlier. The 
process that gets all qubits into pairs has !
2
n 
  
 possibilities that contribute to key size 
(minor changes if n is odd). This step costs 
2
n  CNOT gates. 
Step 4: Now to achieve diffusion defined earlier we want the property that changing the 
value of one qubit in the plaintext changes the statistics of measuring more than half of the 
qubits in the ciphertext. Suppose a qubit jq  is 0  in the plaintext, after jU  in Step 1 it 
becomes 1 20 1j ja a  and   2110p a . If the plaintext jq  is changed to 1  then after 
jU  it becomes 2 10 1j ja a  and   2210p a , so the dependence of jq  on jU  has 
changed. In addition, although the minus sign in 2 10 1j ja a  does not immediately have 
an effect on probabilities, it can change how the subsequent qubits depend on jU  after 
Steps 2 and 3. Hence we see that a value change in one qubit jq  in the plaintext will affect 
all the ciphertext qubits that have gained dependences from jq . This means that any 
upstream qubit kq  with 2
nk   already has diffusion after Steps 2, because all the 
downstream qubits in the ciphertext (more than half of all qubits) have gained dependences 
from kq . Now to create diffusion in the downstream qubits, we just need to use these qubits 
as control and apply CNOT gates to random qubits as targets (can be either upstream or 
downstream) until on average more than half of all qubits have gained dependences from 
any qubit. For example, two qubits have gained dependences from the last qubit nq  after 
Step 3: nq  itself and the qubit assigned to pair with nq , thus we need to apply at most 
2
2
n   CNOT gates using nq  as the control to pass nq ’s dependences to half of all qubits. 
The actual CNOT gates required may be fewer than 2
2
n   because we can first pass nq ’s 
dependences to another downstream qubit such as 2nq  , and then any CNOT gate using 
2nq   as the control will also pass nq ’s dependences to the target. In fact, an example of a 
very efficient implementation is to apply a series of CNOT gates running alternately 
through the downstream and upstream qubits, where the target qubit of the previous CNOT 
serves as the control qubit of the next CNOT: e.g. 1CNOTn  first, then 1 1CNOT n  , then 
1 2CNOTn  , then 2 2CNOT n  , … , finally 2 2 1CNOTn n  . By Theorem 1 it is easy to verify 
that this implementation guarantees more than half of all qubits have gained dependences 
from any downstream qubit. Unlike the previous steps, Step 4 allows greater freedom in 
the key design and the exact evaluation of the contribution to key size and gate cost is 
impossible. However, for the particular implementation just described, the order of the 
upstream qubits can be any permutation and thus there are !
2
n 
  
 possibilities that 
contribute to key size. This implementation costs n CNOT gates. 
Step 4 concludes the ciphertext creation process. A graphical illustration of the four steps 
of encryption is drawn in Figure 1. The account of all the unitaries and CNOT gates used 
is the key shared with the recipient, who can then recover the plaintext by reversing all the 
gates. 
Through the description and analysis of the encrypting process, we can see that our quantum 
encryption scheme supports efficient implementation with  O n  gates and large key size with at 
least !
2
n nO N      
 possible variations. More importantly the design has provable confusion and 
diffusion that makes the key reusable while protecting against common cryptanalytic attacks.  
2.3 Mode of operation. 
The quantum encryption described so far is a block cipher where each block of message containing 
n bits of classical information is encrypted into a quantum state of n qubits. Similar to the classical 
counterpart, the quantum block cipher also requires a mode of operation to ensure that different 
ciphertexts (blocks) are generated even with the same plaintext and key used. This feature together 
with diffusion allows the key to be reused many times to securely transmit large amount of 
information. Our mode of operation is inspired by the classical cipher block chaining (CBC) [21]. 
In the CBC mode a randomly chosen n-bit initialization vector (IV) is XORed (  ) with the 
plaintext 1P  of the first block, the encrypting algorithm then works on 1IV P  to produce the first 
ciphertext 1C . Next 1C  is XORed with the plaintext 2P  of the second block before it is encrypted 
into 2C . Repeat this process many times where each time the plaintext iP  of the current block is 
XORed with the ciphertext 1iC   of the previous block before getting encrypted into the ciphertext 
iC  of the current block: 
    1 0,      IVi i iC E K P C C     (8) 
where  E K  is the encrypting function with the key K. To generalize the CBC to our quantum 
encryption, the ciphertext here is a quantum state that cannot be directly XORed with the plaintext 
of the following block, and in the following we propose two different designs to solve this problem. 
In the first design shown in Figure 2, after the first ciphertext state 1C  has been created 
  1 1 IVC E K P  , we create an additional copy of 1C  and measure it in the computational 
basis  0 , 1 . Because the measurement result has every qubit in 0  or 1 , it can be used as the 
new classical IV to be XORed with the plaintext of the following block. Repeat this process 
iteratively: 
       1 0,      IVi i iC E K P M C M C     (9) 
where  1iM C   is the measurement result on the copy of 1iC  .  
 
Figure 2. The first mode of operation design shown with a 3-block example. In each iteration after the first 
one, the ciphertext state 1iC   is measured into a classical IV that is then XORed with the plaintext iP .  
In the second design shown in Figure 3, after the first ciphertext state has been created by 
   1 1 IVC E K P  , we use the qubits of 1C  as controls to apply CNOT gates to the qubits of 
the following plaintext. Each qubit on 1C  as the control is paired with a different qubit on the 
following plaintext as the target. For simplicity, the same pairing plan that specifies which qubit 
of the current ciphertext state controls which target qubit of the next plaintext can be used for each 
iteration. Repeat this process iteratively: 
 
  
    
1 1
1
IV ,      
CNOT ,     1i i i
C E K P
C E K C P i
 
  
  (10) 
where in the process  1CNOT i iC P   each qubit on the ciphertext state 1iC   as the control 
applies a CNOT to a different qubit on the plaintext state iP  as the target.  
 
Figure 3. The second mode of operation design shown with a 3-block example. In each iteration after the 
first one, each qubit on the ciphertext state 1iC   as the control applies a CNOT to a different qubit on 
the plaintext state iP  as the target.  
Comparing the two designs, the first design is easier to implement because each  1iM C   is 
essentially a classical object and its XOR operation with the plaintext is classical. In addition, the 
IV for each iteration is generated with the true random process of quantum measurement. The 
disadvantage of the first design is the need to share the IV for each iteration with the recipient. As 
each IV is generated after each ciphertext, it cannot be pre-shared. On the other hand the second 
design only needs to pre-share two pieces of information: the initial IV and the pairing plan, and 
no additional information is shared at the time of communication. The drawback of the second 
design is it is slightly harder to implement as it requires the ability to use the ciphertext state to 
control the plaintext. Compared to the classical CBC, both quantum modes of operation have 
additional security because the IV for each iteration is not simply the ciphertext of the last block 
that is revealed to Eve. This is especially true for the second design where the initial IV and the 
pairing plan can be pre-shared as additional parts of the key. Note the initial IV has 2n  complexity, 
and the paring plan has !n  complexity. Both quantum modes of operation ensure different 
ciphertexts are generated even with the same plaintext and key used. 
2.4 Security analysis of the quantum encryption scheme 
The mode of operation together with the key design completes our description of the new quantum 
encryption scheme. The security of the scheme is provided by multiple mechanisms. Firstly the 
use of a quantum state as the ciphertext makes it impossible for Eve to reliably read and analyze 
the ciphertext. In principle Eve could gain statistical knowledge of the ciphertext if the same one 
is sent many times, but this possibility is prevented by implementing one of the two quantum 
modes of operation. Having provable confusion and diffusion provides our method an additional 
layer of protection against potential cryptanalysis. On the contrary, knowing the key, the legitimate 
recipient Bob can easily reverse the encrypting process to generate the plaintext deterministically 
from the ciphertext, without the need to actually read the ciphertext. The unique situation that the 
ciphertext can lead to the plaintext deterministically while not readable itself, together with 
features like confusion, diffusion, and mode of operation, make our quantum encryption strongly 
resistant to the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) and the chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA1 and CCA2). 
In addition, eavesdropping by Eve on the ciphertext inevitably disturbs the quantum state such that 
the recipient Bob can detect such interception. For Bob to determine if his measurement result is 
the correct message, the message disturbed by Eve, or the message corrupted by inherent system 
uncertainties (gate error, channel noise, etc.), multiple blocks of the same plaintext should be sent 
thus to establish a protocol analogous to the repetition code for error correcting purposes. As an 
interesting idea for future studies, the exact number of repetitions required for reliable 
communication should depend on the gate quality, channel quality, and key design.  
III. Conclusion 
In this work we have designed a quantum encryption scheme that utilizes a quantum state creation 
process to encrypt messages. We show that by using a quantum state as the ciphertext and the 
creation procedure as the key, an inherent level of security is guaranteed by the statistical nature 
of quantum measurements as well as the complexity of the state creation process. We then 
introduce the concepts of confusion and diffusion from classical cryptography into quantum 
encryption and provide both features with a novel quantum encryption process. Finally we 
introduce the concept of mode of operation from classical cryptography into quantum encryption 
by proposing two modes of operation inspired by the classical CBC mode. Combining all the 
features our new quantum encryption method provides reusability of the keys and strong protection 
against standard cryptanalytic attacks. 
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